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Summary This paper presents a debate in which the authors participated at the
World Psychiatric Association conference in Cape Town, South Africa in November
2016. Professor van Staden acted as chair and here, as at the debate, provides a
rationale for debating a topic that many of those involved in mental health believe to
be decided. The discussion that ensued demonstrated, however, that while the
arguments have moved on they have not ceased. Who won? Well that depends how
you look at it. A few in the audience shifted position towards the motion but the
majority remained opposed. What do you think?
Declaration of interest None.
Introduction: Werdie van Staden
‘Preposterous’ or ‘high time’ may be the respective responses
of antagonists and protagonists to the claim that the concept
of culture has outlived its usefulness for psychiatry.
Philosophical rigour, however, requires much more than an
exclamation of sentiment. Such rigour is probably demon-
strated best by articulating an argument that goes against
one’s own sentiment, thereby unpacking and clarifying the
issues at stake. This article follows suit, thus not committing
our contributors beyond the remits of this article – an article
that is about the ‘what’ (i.e. the content) as well as the ‘how’
(i.e. argument).
The topic is patently relevant considering the provisions
for culture by the DSM-5,1 speciﬁcally through cultural con-
cepts of distress, the cultural formulation and the cultural
formulation interview. In addition, connections between cul-
ture and mental health may variously and profoundly be
found in the way culture aﬀects the various mental disorders
in their expression, experience, interpretation, course and
outcome. One may assert that culture inﬂuences individual
resilience, coping mechanisms and social response, which
are all crucial for recovery from mental health problems.
Anthropologically, one may assert that mental health prac-
tice involves the meeting of at least two cultural worlds:
the clinician’s and the patient’s.2
A scholarly debate provides for consideration, if of good
logical pedigree, of the diﬀerences as well as the similarities
shared by both sides of the debate. As an introduction to the
arguments of our pairs of protagonists and antagonists, two
shared features are highlighted: ‘culture’ necessarily involves
practice and values.
The ﬁrst protagonist, Mohammed Rashed, raises the
issue of the conceptual relation between cultural group iden-
tity and culture as a dynamic set of shared practices. Taking
the latter rather than the former as constitutive of culture,
cultural group identity is shown to be a conceptual derivative
of shared practice rather than the (commonly assumed) con-
verse. The premise also underpins the antagonist argument
of Abdi Sanati below. Following Wittgenstein’s private lan-
guage argument, he argues that without culture there cannot
be language, and, hence, no psychiatry.
The premise that culture is constituted by shared prac-
tice thus features on both sides of the debate, with concep-
tual implications that are beyond the scope of this article.
One example, nonetheless, may serve to enlighten their
arguments. This premise unmasks the mistaken assumption
that culture is necessarily conﬁned to a geographical location
(as does the DSM-5).2 Examples of the contrary are found in
shared practice: the internet culture, the renaissance culture,
a scientiﬁc culture, a 21st century culture, a ‘Googling’ cul-
ture, etc.
An emphasis on values is shared by the arguments of the
protagonist, Norman Poole, and the antagonist, Rachel
Bingham. The inevitable cultural origins of values are under-
scored in Bingham’s argument, whereas Poole is concerned
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by the alienating and exoticising consequences of ascribing
mental disorder to cultural values.
Space here does not allow for rebuttal, but the scene is
set, no doubt, for further discussion.
For the motion, Mohammed A. Rashed
I am going to argue for this motion: I believe that the concept
of culture has outlived its usefulness for psychiatry. I believe
so not because I amadefender of a reductive, biological psych-
iatry – I amnot –but because among the twodeﬁnitions of cul-
ture that are, in my view, of relevance to mental health, the
ﬁrst is so general so as to dissolve into the concept ofmeaning,
and the second is so unjustiﬁably homogenising as to require
that we explore the patient’s beliefs and values without the
assumption of a cultural group.
Culture has many deﬁnitions; I list four.
1 Culture in the sense of activity: the tending of natural
growth; to cultivate the land, to breed animals, and to
await the growth of bacteria in a Petri dish.3 This mean-
ing of culture is irrelevant to our debate.
2 Culture also in the sense of activity, but instead of culti-
vating vegetables and bacteria, we cultivate our intellec-
tual capacities and create civilisation. This meaning of
culture lives today in the ‘culture’ section of newspapers.4
This meaning of culture, as well, is not relevant here.
3 Culture as a noun, denoting groups of people united by
shared beliefs and practices; for example, Maori culture,
Muslim culture, and so on.5 This meaning of culture is
relevant.
4 Finally, culture as socially acquired and shared symbols,
meanings and signiﬁcances that structure experience,
behaviour, interpretation and social interaction; culture
‘orients people in their ways of feeling, thinking, and
being in the world’ (Jenkins & Barrett 2004,6 p. 5; see
Rashed 2013,4 p. 4). This concept of culture is analytic
in the sense that its introduction enables researchers
and theoreticians to account for the speciﬁc nature of,
and the diﬀerences among, various social phenomena
and people’s subjective reports of their experiences. For
example, a prolonged feeling of sadness can be explained
by one person as the eﬀect of a neurochemical imbalance,
by another as the eﬀect of malevolent spirits, and by
another as a test of one’s faith: these diﬀerences can be
accounted for through the concept of culture.
Having identiﬁed twomeanings of culture that are relevant to
this motion, I want to show why we should abandon the term
culture. Consider the ﬁnal deﬁnition: culture as socially
acquired meanings and signiﬁcances. Here we are talking
about interpretation and giving meaning to our experiences,
to the experiences of others, to social events and to behaviour.
For example, in many societies, there exists the phenomenon
of the evil eye.2 This is an innate capacity to do unintentional
harm through a direct look when encountering abundance or
beauty in situations that evoke genuine admiration and appre-
ciation. Itmay aﬀect animals, plants,material possessions and
human beings. People for whom this notion is relevant regu-
larly explain misfortune – for example, if a tree dies or a well
dries – by saying that a person who visited recently had
given a ‘bad eye’. For other people, however, seeing a friend’s
new car is an occasion to say something like ‘congratulations’
and to ask go for a drive, without worry that one might have,
inadvertently, given the bad eye.
Now, both approaches to such a social encounter involve
an interpretation and a related response, and this applies to
all social encounters irrespective of where the involved indi-
viduals come from. But then what part does the term ‘cul-
ture’ play here? If everything is culture, in the sense that
everything is subject to interpretation, then it would seem
that we just need to attend to that without having to invoke
an overarching thing called ‘culture’. It could be objected
that the term culture is helpful because it allows us to iden-
tify a certain set of interpretations that occur together regu-
larly, and to give that a name. This brings us to the third
deﬁnition of culture I mentioned earlier: culture as a noun
denoting groups. So, for example, the beneﬁt of using the
term Maori culture is that we can refer to a set of interpre-
tations and practices that Maoris do: a shorthand to refer to
a whole group and ascribe to them certain beliefs and prac-
tices. This, however, is problematic. The idea that we can
demarcate a group of people that believe this or that and
do such and such has been debunked as an anthropological
ﬁction belonging to the European missionaries and adven-
turers of the ﬁrst half of the previous century. It downplays
individual agency in favour of some homogenous thing called
‘those people’s culture’.3 Consider, again, the evil eye, a phe-
nomenon which I studied in Egypt. No two people agreed on
what it meant, on its importance, on the extent to which it is
a genuine problem, or on the situations in which it can be
harmful. In fact, the description I gave earlier is quite par-
tial; people appropriated the notion and made it their own,
and they had a unique sense of what it is and whether or
not it is relevant to them.
The notion of a cultural group may be useful politically,
but it’s not useful for psychiatry. The clinical encounter
must always involve a serious inquiry into the person’s beliefs
and values, and this has to occur every time irrespective of
where the clinician and the patient come from; that is, irre-
spective of their presumed ‘culture’. In fact, to continue to
use the term culture to refer to a group can be detrimental
in that it may make the clinician think that he or she under-
stands the patient – that the patient is ‘Muslim’ or ‘Maori’ or
‘Irish’ – when that understanding may be no more than a
stereotype and hence a further obstacle to engaging with
the other person’s worldview. To recap, the concept of culture
is no longer useful for psychiatry; if we understand culture as
meanings and signiﬁcances, then we need to stay with those
notions, the term ‘culture’ playing no useful part. If we under-
stand culture as referring to bounded groups, we would be
holding a discredited view of culture, and a view that may pre-
vent genuine engagement between clinicians and patients.
Against the motion, Rachel Bingham
A central conceptual struggle in psychiatry is the question of
how to deﬁne mental disorder, and thereby delineate the
proper boundaries of psychiatric practice. The concept of cul-
ture may arise in various ways; for example, in drawing a dis-
tinction between religious experience and psychopathology,7
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or between social deviance and mental disorder.8 Here, I will
argue that the concept of culture is more useful than ever.
My argument, brieﬂy, is that the boundary between mental
health and ill health is deﬁned by values, and values arise
from culture; therefore, mental health and psychiatric prac-
tice cannot be understood without attention to culture.
Developing this, I suggest that not only do values depend
on culture, but values and culture overlap, or partly constitute
each other. Accordingly, to say something about a person’s
culture is to say something about her values, and vice versa.
If so, the concept of culture should be considered vital to
values-based practice.9
The concept of culture is used here to refer to socially
acquired meanings that shape our experiences, our under-
standings of our experiences, the behaviours of others and
social events more broadly. These shared meanings may
inﬂuence not only when I believe myself to be unwell and
what response I consider is required, but may also shape my
experiences, actually contributing to whether or not I feel
unwell or in need of help in the given circumstances.7 It is
important not to overstate the homogeneity of cultural mean-
ings within a group. I may not endorse all supposedly shared
beliefs and values of all contexts I inhabit, and it will be diﬃ-
cult to make predictions about my beliefs and values by sur-
veying the community in which I live. Nevertheless, I will be
aﬀected by others’ beliefs and values – whether I endorse
them, unquestioningly go along with them, or even use my
rejection of the beliefs and values of my community as a
springboard from which to ﬁnd my own way.
Values are integral to the concept of mental disorder, just
as they are to the concept of culture. Attempts to deﬁne men-
tal disorder in purely objective, factual terms have not been
successful.10 Distinctions between mental disorder and men-
tal health are irreducibly normative. Facts alone cannot tell us
which statistically extreme deviations, such as genius or avar-
ice, are pathological. Neither can facts alone tell us what is
functional or dysfunctional, as functions themselves are rela-
tive to some valued outcome or purpose. Even if the neural
correlates were described for every item in a list of diagnos-
able mental disorders, we would rely on values to decide
the contents of that list. Otherwise, we would merely have a
list of states involving changes in the brain, including, per-
haps, love or criminality, with no further directions as to
which are the proper business of psychiatry.11
Values, then, are essential to the concept of mental dis-
order. And values, as discussed, are not only inﬂuenced by
culture, but contribute to culture, and vice versa. But if so,
why not abandon culture altogether, as redundant, and
focus only on what people value? Yet, to focus only on values
and not their context does not serve psychiatry well.
Whether values, meanings and interpretations are shared
or not may inﬂuence whether a particular experience is
interpreted as illness, or as some other unusual or distres-
sing but essentially normal state. For example, whether
experiences such as fear or hearing voices are shared and
understood contributes to whether an individual is consid-
ered to be gifted, possessed, well or unwell. In other
words, the values and beliefs of our community may partly
constitute our experience of illness. The extent to which
these meanings are shared may even determine whether or
not a diagnosis is made.
In conclusion, among many uses of the concept of cul-
ture, one important feature is to describe something other
than scientiﬁc facts: something essentially about values.
Yet, psychiatry cannot focus only on values, abandoning cul-
ture, because part of both the experience and the diagnosis
of mental health problems depends on the context – the
shared beliefs and meanings – in which values arise and
develop. Accordingly we need to see the practice of psych-
iatry as part of a wider context, as happening in a time
and place that inﬂuence how it proceeds. We need to see
our clients, patients, colleagues and ourselves as coming
from contexts that inﬂuence not only whether we experience
distressing or disabling symptoms, but also whether these
symptoms are interpreted as illness. Unless we can say this
is really being done well, without the need for further theor-
etical work, we cannot dispense with the concept of culture.
For the motion, Norman A. Poole
As a neuropsychiatrically inclined psychiatrist, it might be
assumed that my reservations stem from a preference for
biological explanations in psychiatry. While there is some-
thing to be said for the role of neuroimaging and biological
investigations in psychiatry – for example, the measurement
of hippocampal volume and cerebrospinal ﬂuid beta-amyloid
concentration in early stage Alzheimer’s disease – they do
not satisfactorily address the motion, which, let us recall,
is that culture has outlived its usefulness for psychiatry.
This is not to argue that the focus on culture has hindered
psychiatry. Indeed, the transcultural psychiatrists have,
among others, helped us to see that biological reductionism
is simplistic and wrong-headed. The diagnosis of mental dis-
order is at the normative level,12 just as the culturally orien-
tated psychiatrists claimed. Furthermore, transcultural
psychiatry has shown that what is deemed pathological in
one culture need not be viewed as such within another.
Demon possession is considered abnormal in the West, but
this does not generalise to all other situations. What is left
to discuss? It appears I am at one with my opponents.
My reservation is that cross-cultural psychiatry priori-
tises diﬀerence at the expense of universality, thereby exoti-
cising mental disorder and potentially alienating patients
further. Those with so-called culture-bound syndromes
appear in the literature like new species of tropical bird for
the reader to gape and wonder at. Worse still is the tendency,
familiar to anyone who has worked in areas of diversity, for
clinicians with a smattering of mandatory ‘cross-cultural
training’ to dismiss unusual behaviour as ‘cultural’. I’ve
heard this applied to new-onset domestic violence and social
withdrawal; cases of frontal temporal dementia and schizo-
phrenia, respectively, as it turned out.
Instead, I wish to present the view that what goes awry
at the level of norms and values is more universal than the
transcultural psychiatrists have supposed. Consider Pascal
Boyer’s notion of a folk psychiatry, which is parasitical on
what is called intuitive psychology.13 That is, the tendency
to understand one’s own and others’ behaviour through
appeal to unobservable mental states such as beliefs, desires
and emotions, including their relation to one another. Most
of this is done at a level beneath conscious awareness; we
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become aware only of the outcome. And our intuitive
expectations of one another are composed of domain-
speciﬁc abilities rather than this being a general process.
While there are diﬀerences in explicit psychological models
around the world, the evidence from developmental psych-
ology is that intuitive abilities are universal; the best-known
being theory of mind, which occurs in all cultures studied to
date.14 Other tenets of intuitive psychology include: mental
states somehow represent or map the world as it is; behav-
iour is internally generated; memory is a store of past
experience; communication follows tacit but constraining
programmatic principles, with each party endeavouring to
ensure the other’s ongoing comprehension; a largely uncon-
scious reading of others’ subtle emotional cues; and so on.
That these develop in infancy implies they are more uni-
versal than local. For instance, babies preferentially attend
to objects that appear to interact with one another, such
as the Heider and Simmel animation involving an ‘aggres-
sive’ triangle and ‘fearful’ circle (https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=VTNmLt7QX8E). No one, with the exception of
those with autism,15 has any trouble in attributing internal
mental states to these shapes. Indeed, feelings of pity for
the circle are frequently evoked.
The idea is that mental disorder is implied when behav-
iour, including verbal behaviour, contravenes one or more of
our tacit expectations. People with schizophrenia exhibit dis-
ordered thought and speech that fails to follow the tacit rules
of checking, repair, reducing ambiguity and so forth, which
are apparent to carers and ﬁll the psychopathology textbooks.
It is important to note that this failure to meet the expecta-
tions of intuitive psychology are not mere violations of social
norms – it is possible to behave in a socially unacceptable
manner without there being a corresponding diﬃculty with
its understandability. Repeat oﬀenders are socially sanc-
tioned, but few of us have trouble attributing a motive to
their crimes. Intuitive psychology also seems to help sort
the classic cross-cultural psychiatric cases, without recourse
to culture. The belief that one is possessed by demons does
not in the West seem to map or represent the world accur-
ately. There are, however, other accepted means for the acqui-
sition of belief; beliefs can also arise from the testimony of
others.16 The belief that one is possessed by demons is
accepted in some cultures, because the belief is acquired
from authority, i.e. the rest of the group. This removes cul-
ture, because it is a fault with the mechanism of belief acqui-
sition that triggers suspicion of dysfunction rather than the
more general notion of a social norm being contravened.17
To conclude, culture has outlived its usefulness
for psychiatry because it has misconceived the level at
which things go wrong in mental disorder. Those with
mental disorder are not identiﬁed merely for social
deviancy but because some aspect of their behaviour fails to
meet the intuitive and universally held psychological expecta-
tions of others. By focusing at this level, we are better able to
appreciate what unites us, both in sickness and in health.
Against the motion, Abdi Sanati
In what follows, I aim to show that culture is inseparable
from psychiatry, and that, in fact, psychiatry cannot be
practised, or conceived of, without culture. One can think
of diﬀerent ways to link psychiatry and culture. One of the
most basic ones is through language. First, let us focus on
the relationship between language and psychiatry. One of
the important, and in my opinion essential, elements of
psychiatry and its practice is psychopathology. It provides
the framework within which we deﬁne signs and symptoms
of mental disorders and communicate them to others. And
language plays a necessary part in this discipline. From an
ontological point of view, I ﬁnd it hard to imagine the exist-
ence of delusions, verbal hallucinations and obsessional
thoughts without language. From an epistemological point
of view, to say any enquiry about human emotions is impo-
verished without use of language is an understatement. Even
describing purely behavioural signs needs a language.
Now, I shall consider the relationship between language
and culture. Culture and society are inseparable. One of the
integral elements in every society is communication.
Language is one of the most complex means of communica-
tion and has enabled human society to achieve immense
complexity. The increase in the complexity of language
contributed to the increase in the complexity of the culture.
The increase in complexities of culture, in turn, feed back
to make language more complex. There are many other
factors operating in this process; for instance, I cannot
deny the impact of technology on both culture and language.
However, there is a deﬁnite link between culture and lan-
guage. One can argue that while there is a deﬁnite associ-
ation between culture and language, this association is
merely a contingent one and it does not necessarily have
to be the case. In the next step, I shall argue that the asso-
ciation is indeed necessary; that is, without culture we
would not have language. Here, I rely on the work of
Ludwig Wittgenstein, especially his private language argu-
ment. Wittgenstein explores whether there is a possibility
of existence of a language which is logically private; that is,
it could be understandable only by one person.18 To clarify,
it is not the possibility of a language that someone like me
can develop, which can be deciphered, but the possibility
of a language by someone who has been separate from others
since birth: a born Robinson Crusoe. This is diﬀerent from
development of a new language by someone who already is
a language speaker. That person is already in possession of
language skills, and the new language would follow accepted
rules. The Crusoe-type person in question does not have any
awareness of the rules of language and has to develop them
from scratch. In other words, this language is developed de
novo in an individual who has never been part of a commu-
nity/culture. Wittgenstein concludes that ‘a language in
principle unintelligible to anyone but its originating user is
impossible. The reason for this is that such a so-called lan-
guage would, necessarily, be unintelligible to its supposed
originator too, for he would be unable to establish meanings
for its putative signs’.19 Why would he be unable to do so?
The answer lies in Wittgenstein’s description of language.
According to Wittgenstein, to understand a word is not to
have a mental process signifying it. It is knowing how to
use the word. In other words, it is to know how to follow
the rules of using the words in diﬀerent linguistic activities
such as questioning, asserting, joking, demanding, etc.
Language is a rule-governed activity. And to follow a rule
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one needs public criteria, i.e. something outside oneself to
objectively conﬁrm that the rule is followed. By objective,
Wittgenstein does not mean that the rules are in some way
independent of our practice, something he asserted in his
earlier philosophy, but that what constitutes a rule is our
collective use of it. Rule-following is a general practice estab-
lished by agreement, custom and training.20 He argues that
the concept of rule presupposes a custom. It is a cultural
phenomenon. It cannot be imagined to happen individually,
independent of ‘historical groups of individuals who are
bound together into a community by a shared set of complex,
language-involving practices’.21 There is a vital connection
between language and the complex set of practices and
activities that binds a community together. Language is
interwoven into the activities of the people and is fundamen-
tally cultural in nature. In other words, without culture there
cannot be language and, hence, no psychiatry.
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